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1 Introduction
Suppose a population of agents faces the collective action (Olson 1965) challenge
to provide public goods by means of simultaneous, separate voluntary contributions
games (Isaac et al. 1985). In each one, the collective would benefit from high contribu-
tions but individuals may have strategic incentives (Nash 1950) to contribute less. Such
situations, also known as ‘social dilemmas’, are related to collective management of
‘common-pool resources’ (Ostrom 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992) and often result
in underprovisioning of the public good (i.e. tragedy of the commons as in Hardin
1968) because of the misalignment of collective interests and strategic incentives.
Generally, grave underprovision of the public good is the unique Nash equilib-
rium when individual contribution decisions are independent of the matching process.
Andreoni (1988)’s model of a linear public goods game with random re-matching
of groups is the best-known experimental instantiation of this, and numerous stud-
ies have reported corresponding decays in contributions when such games are played
in the laboratory (Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). Predictions may change dramat-
ically, however, when agents are matched ‘assortatively’ instead, that is, based on
their pre-committed choice on how much to contribute so that high (low) contributors
are matched with other high (low) contributors. Such mechanisms have been coined
‘meritocratic group-based matching’ (Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2010a), short ‘merito-
cratic matching’ (Nax et al. 2014).1 Under meritocratic matching, new equilibria
emerge through assortative matching that are as good as near-efficient (Gunnthorsdot-
tir et al. 2010a; Nax et al. 2014). Indeed, when better (i.e. more efficient) equilibria
exist, humans have been shown to consistently play them in controlled laboratory
environments (Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2010a, b; Nax et al. 2017; Rabanal and Rabanal
2014).
In this paper, we address the important question of how robust the positive pre-
dictions stemming from assortative matching are. To assess this, we generalize the
baseline model on two dimensions. On the one hand, we consider a range of public-
goods provision efficacies that nests the standard marginal-per-capita-rate-of-return
(‘mpcr’) model as a special, linear case. On the other hand, we allow heterogeneity
in players’ budgets, expressing the ex ante inequality amongst individuals. In other
contexts, heterogeneity has been shown to ‘help’ cooperation (Perc 2011). Our work,
in particular, builds on one prior attempt at generalizing the standard model in terms
of heterogeneity by Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2010b), who consider two levels of budgets
in the standard case of mpcr-linear payoffs.
Methodologically, we blend analytical and computational approaches. Our results
summarize as follows. We show analytically that the consequences of permitting het-
erogeneity in terms of provision of the public good depend crucially on the exact nature
of the underlying public-good provision efficacy, but generally are devastating. Indeed,
all near-efficient Nash equilibria that exist under homogeneity fall apart when hetero-
geneity is allowed. Instead, we are either back at the negative all-contribute-nothing
1 Note that this kind of mechanism differs crucially from other contribution-inducing mechanisms such as
‘punishment’ (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Perc 2011) as no payoff additions, subtractions or transfer between
individuals take place.
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equilibrium or new, previously impossible, complex mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
emerge. In the latter case, the expected level of resulting public-good provision depends
crucially on (i) the public-good provision efficacy and (ii) the population inequality.
These mixed equilibria are virtually impossible to characterize and to evaluate ana-
lytically for general cases. We therefore use computational methods and quantify the
loss resulting from heterogeneity vis-a-vis the homogeneous case as a function of
parameters regarding (i) and (ii). Thus, our analysis provides novel insights regarding
the possible consequences in terms of making wrong predictions when assuming a
homogeneous population, which in many real-world cases may be unrealistic.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Next, we set up the model including
details about our computational algorithm. Section 3 contains the paper’s results.
Section 4 concludes. An “Appendix” contains details of the analytical results.
2 The Model
N players are assigned an initial endowment wi , that might be different for each player
i , and play the following game, of which all aspects are common knowledge:
1. Actions Each player makes a simultaneous and committed unilateral decision
regarding how much of his endowment to contribute. We will indicate with
αi ∈ [0, 1] the percentage of wi contributed by player i . We indicate with α = {αi }
the array of strategies obtained in this way and with α−i the strategy vector obtained
excluding agent i .
2. Matching Players are ranked by their effective contributions si = wiαi (from
highest to lowest with random tie-breaking). They are then assigned to M = N
S
equal-sized groups of size S, such that the S highest-ranking players are assigned
to the first group, the S second-highest ranking players are assigned to the second,
etc.
3. Outcome Payoffs φi realize based on the contribution total in each group. Each
player receives the amount that he did not contribute plus the sum of all the
contributions made by the members of his group multiplied by a factor Q (the
marginal-per-capita-rate-of-return):





j w j (1)
with Gi being the group to which agent i belongs.
The mpcr Q represents the benefits of cooperation among members of the same
group. When 1
S
< Q < 1 the game is a social dilemma, meaning that group efficiency
is maximized if every member contributes fully but doing so is always a dominated
strategy.
The parameter γ in the return from the common pool is a measure of the “goodness”
of the public-good provision efficacy. For high values of γ (super-linear payoffs) even
a high percentage of contributions has little effect on the common pool, thus making
the public good less fruitful. On the other end, for low γ values (sub-linear payoffs)
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even a small contribution allows players to obtain large benefits from cooperation. It
is important to notice that the value of γ determines also the maximum efficiency2 of
the system ranging from wi + Q
∑
j∈Gi
w j for γ → 0 to wi for γ → ∞.
Simulation
We simulate the above model in the following way:
1. Initialization: We assign the initial endowments to each player sampling them
from a truncated Gaussian distribution with mean W0 and standard deviation σ .
The distribution is truncated at wi = 0 and wi = 2W0 so that endowments are
always positive and symmetrically distributed around W0.
2. Setting initial strategies: The initial strategy αi of each player is set to 0, hence
the simulation starts in the fully defective state.3
3. Dynamics of play: Each player updates his strategy in the following way:
– With probability p he keeps playing the strategy played the round before.4
– With probability 1 − p he myopically best responds to the strategies played by
the other agents the round before:
The agent checks what would his rank and consequent payoff be for each of
the possible strategies5 he can play, given that the other agents keep playing the
strategies played the round before. He then chooses the strategy that results in
the highest payoff.
4. Group matching: Based on the contribution of each player, groups are formed as
described above and payoffs are then materialized.
5. Update and repeat: The endowment of each player is then reset to his initial one
and the algorithm repeats from step 3.
After T rounds the algorithm stops and the population average of the strategies is
computed. The procedure is repeated E N times and the ensemble average of the
population average is obtained.
3 Results
The above game exhibits different Nash equilibria depending on the value of γ and
on the players having different or the same initial endowments.








3 Different initial starting conditions have been explored and they have been observed to have no effect on
the final outcome of the simulation.
4 Inertia was added to ensure the convergence to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (if existing). Without
inertia, the best-response dynamics could oscillate around such an equilibrium.
5 The interval [0, 1] is discretized for computational purposes.
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As already shown in Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2010a), in the case of linear payoff
(γ = 1) and homogeneous players the voluntary contribution game with assortative
matching has multiple pure strategy Nash Equilibria: one is non contribution by all
players and the others are almost Pareto optimal equilibria in which nearly all players
contribute their entire endowment and few (less than the group size) contribute nothing.
It is easy to see (see “Appendix”) that this result actually holds for any value of γ bigger
than a threshold value γ̄ , with γ̄ < 1 and depending on groups size, mpcr and the
total number of players. The only difference with the linear payoff case is that for







sublinear payoffs such that γ > γ̄ , the Nash Equilibria are: all players contribute ᾱ
and all players contribute their total endowment except for few players that contribute
ᾱ. For very small values of the exponent of the public good provision, the numbers of
non contributors6 in the near efficient equilibrium becomes too high to be sustained.
Hence, even though the nearly efficient outcome would be highly rewarding, for γ ≤ γ̄
the only existing equilibrium is that all players contribute ᾱ.7
A key property of the game, necessary for the nearly efficient equilibria to exist, is
that ties in the ranking placement are broken at random. In all these equilibria, in fact,
there exists a mixed group where fully contributive players are grouped with defectors,
i.e. players contributing the within group Nash Equilibrium. In order for this to be a NE,
the fully contributive players must have a sufficiently high probability to be grouped
only with other full contributors so that they would not benefit (in expectation) by
decreasing their contribution and be placed with certainty in the defectors group.
If each player is endowed with a different initial wealth, however, things change
drastically. The heterogeneity of the players implies that there cannot be an equilibrium
where more than one player contributes the same positive percentage of his endow-
ment: Since players are ranked based on their effective contributions si = wiαi , if more
than one player were to contribute the same percentage, the one with the highest endow-
ment would have a profitable deviation due to the existence of the mixed group. He
could in fact contribute slightly more and be guaranteed to be placed in a better group.
If the two players were already contributing everything, the wealthiest player could
instead contribute slightly less and still be guaranteed to remain in the same group.
For the above reason, the nearly efficient Nash Equilibria in which almost all players
contribute everything does not exist for heterogeneous players. Moreover, any unique
contribution αi such that ᾱ < αi < 1 is also clearly not a Nash Equilibrium due to the
fact that it would be possible to contribute less and still be placed in the same group.
Furthermore, for sublinear payoffs (γ < 1) the equilibrium in which all players
contribute the within group Nash Equilibrium does not exist. Indeed, for γ < 1 we
have that ᾱ > 0 and if all players were to play ᾱ, players with a lower endowment
6 i.e. people contributing only ᾱ.
7 All players contributing ᾱ is always an equilibrium for homogeneous players. The proof proceeds like
in the linear case: it does not make sense to be the only player contributing more than that because this
would only make the player’s groupmates better off at the player’s expense. Contributing less than ᾱ is
never beneficial, not even with random re-matching of groups, because of the non-linearity of the payoff
function. See the “Appendix” for more details.
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Table 1 In this table we show which equilibria exist for homogeneous and heterogeneous players depending
on the value of γ
γ ≤ γ̄ γ̄ < γ < 1 γ ≥ 1
PSL MS PSH PSL MS PSH PSL MS PSH
Homog. ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Heterog. ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗
For homogeneous players, for any payoff such that γ is bigger than a threshold value γ̄ , there exist one
Nash Equilibrium in which all players contribute nothing (indicated as PSL) and almost Pareto optimal
Nash Equilibria where almost all players contribute everything and few (less than the group size) contribute
the within group NE ᾱ. (PSH). For γ < γ̄ , the only Nash Equilibirum is for everybody to contribute ᾱ. In
these cases, there exist no mixed strategy (MS) Nash Equilibrium. For heterogeneous players the situation
is different for different values of γ . For sublinear payoffs (γ < 1) there exist no pure strategy equilibria
and hence the only Nash Equilibrium is in mixed strategies. For superlinear payoffs (γ ≥ 1), the only pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium is non-contribution by all players
would have a profitable deviation by increasing their contributions and being grouped
with players with a higher endowment. Hence, for heterogeneous players and sublinear
payoffs there exist no pure strategy Nash Equilibria for the game.
For superlinear payoffs (γ ≥ 1), however, the within group Nash Equilibrium
is to contribute nothing and hence the pure strategy equilibrium in which no player
contributes anything continues to exist. Consequently, there are no mixed strategy
Nash Equilibria for this game.
Table 1 summarizes which Nash Equilibria exist in which situation. In the
“Appendix” we formally derive the results described in this section.
To obtain the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game we resort to computational
methods. We simulate agents playing the game for different payoffs and different
width of the initial wealth distribution.
We are mainly interested in a comparison between the (unique) equilibria in the
case of heterogeneous players and the equilibria reached in the homogeneous case.
In particular, we are interested in how much efficiency (see footnote 2) is lost due to
the heterogeneity of players. Indeed, even though non contribution by all is a Nash
Equilibrium, the quasi Pareto optimal equilibrium is payoff dominant8 and hence is
the one to which we refer (when it exists). Furthermore, experimental results (Gun-
nthorsdottir et al. 2010a) have also shown that the nearly efficient equilibria are the
one reached by the population.
In Fig. 1 we plot the loss of efficiency due to the heterogeneity of the players with
respect to the level of contributions that would have been achieved in the homogeneous
case as a function of γ and for a choice or representative parameters. A 100% loss
(dashed red line) indicates that all players contribute nothing and thus that there is a
complete loss of efficiency with respect to the homogeneous case. A 0% loss (dashed
green line) means that the system reaches the same efficiency as it would with homo-
8 Here we use payoff dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Harsanyi (1995). The nearly
efficient equilibrium can be shown to be ex-ante payoff dominant (Gunnthorsdottir et al. 2010a).
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Fig. 1 Here we show the loss of efficiency in case of heterogeneous players with respect to the level
of contribution that would have been achieved in the homogeneous case. A 100% loss (dashed red line)
indicates that all players contribute nothing and thus that there is a complete loss of efficiency with respect to
the homogeneous case. A 0% loss (dashed green line) means that the system reaches the same efficiency that
it would have reached in the case of homogeneous players. A negative loss (striped orange area below the
green line) indicates that when endowments are heterogeneous the equilibrium reaches a higher efficiency
than in the homogeneous case. As predicted, for superlinear payoffs γ ≥ 1 the only possible equilibrium
is non contribution by all and thus the loss of efficiency is total (right side of the picture). For intermediate
sublinear payoff we can see that the efficiency is not completely lost and that it goes from being quite low
to being closer to the homogeneous case. The quantitative value of efficiency that the mixed equilibrium
achieves depends on the value of the mpcr and the width of the distribution of initial wealth as well as
from other parameters. Finally, for γ ≤ γ̄ we first observe a slight increase in efficiency (below the dashed
green line) and then the efficiency approaches the homogeneous one (left side of the picture), on account of
the benefits of cooperation being obtainable for an arbitrary small contribution. Hence, for a wide range of
values of γ , we observe a significant loss in efficiency compared to the homogeneous case. The simulation
was obtained for the following set of parameters: N = 100, S = 4, Q = 0.6, W0 = 2, E N = 50, p = 0.2
and σ = 0.45. For these parameters, γ̄ ≈ 0.29. (Color figure online)
geneous players. A negative loss indicates that when endowments are heterogeneous
the equilibrium reaches a higher efficiency than in the homogeneous case.
We observe, as predicted, that for superlinear payoffs the only possible equilibrium
is non contribution by all and thus that the loss of efficiency is total. For intermediate
sublinear payoff the system achieves different efficiency level, from quite low ones
to levels closer to the homogeneous case. The quantitative value of efficiency that
the mixed equilibrium achieves depends on the value of the mpcr and the width of
the distribution of initial wealth as well as from other parameters. For values of the
exponent of the public good provision lower than γ̄ , we initially observe an increase in
efficiency when endowments are heterogeneous. This is due to the fact that for values
of γ slightly below γ̄ , the only equilibrium in the homogeneous case is to contribute
ᾱ but it would still be more efficient if more players contributed a higher percentage
of their endowment. Finally, for γ → 0, the heterogeneous system approaches the
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same efficiency of the homogeneous, on account of the benefits of cooperation being
obtainable for an arbitrary small contribution.
Interestingly, one can observe that the efficiency loss doesn’t seem to change much
for different widths of the endowment distribution (see online material).
For the width of the distribution equal to 0 we observe, as expected, the Nash
Equilibria in case of homogeneous endowments.9
For different values of the marginal per capita rate of return we observe from the
simulations (see online material for examples) that the higher the mpcr, the wider
is the area with partial efficiency losses in the picture and the smaller is the gain in
efficiency around γ̄ .
Hence we can conclude that for a wide range of payoffs, the more realistic assump-
tion of heterogeneous players leads to a disruptive loss in efficiency when compared
to the homogeneous case. For a very limited range of γ , however, heterogeneity seems
to result in a small increase in efficiency.
4 Summary of Results
In summary, mechanisms based on assortative matching promise large efficiency gains
when the interaction is such that it is safe to assume that the population consists
only of equals. In the presence of heterogeneity, however, whether and how much
assortative matching is likely to gain the population (relative to random matching)
depends crucially on the provision efficacy of the public good and on the precise
degree of heterogeneity. This implies that guarantees of more equal playing fields in
these environments may be as important as implementation of assortative matching.
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Appendix: Nash Equilibria
In this section we derive the Nash Equilibria of the generalized assortative matching
voluntary contribution game.
9 Note that there is no continuous convergence from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous case. This
is a direct consequence of the fact that, as discussed before, as soon as heterogeneous endowments are
introduced, there cannot be an equilibrium where more than one player contributes the same positive
percentage of his endowment. This makes the existence of a mixed group impossible. See Lemma 7 in the
“Appendix”.
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We first define the game and derive some useful properties of it. Later, we show
which equilibria exist for homogeneous and heterogeneous players for different values
of the public good game efficacy.
Notation
– The expected payoff of player i is
Ei (αi , α−i ) = (wi − si ) +
M∑
k=1









with M = N
S
the number of groups in the population, Sk−i the sum of the effective
contributions in agent’s i group minus his own and Pr (k | αi , α−i ) the probability
of being ranked kth given αi and α−i . We indicate with S the size of the groups.
– We say that players i, j are in class Cr if si = s j = s
r . We write cr ≡ |Cr | =
Dr · S + c̃r ; Dr , c̃r ∈ N ∪ {0}.
10 Note that by definition 0 ≤ c̃r < S.
– We call h the highest effective contribution and H the number of players s.t.
αi = h; hence H ≡ |C1|.
– We indicate with z the number of players playing the strategy ᾱ.
– Full heterogeneity means that wi 
= w j ∀i 
= j .
Let us first compute the within group best response.
Lemma 1 The best response within a group is: αi = ᾱ if 0 < γ < 1 and αi = 0 if
γ ≥ 1.
Proof The within group payoff is defined as following:






with Gi being the group to which agent i belongs and αi ∈ [0, 1].
The first order condition reads:
∂φi
∂αi











implying the following payoff for agent i :
wi (1 − ᾱ) + wi Qᾱ
γ + C (4)
with C defined as
∑




j w j .
The payoff for the corner strategies instead is wi + C for α = 0 and wi Q + C for
α = 1.
10 Or alternatively, Dr and c̃r are defined as the unique non-negative integers such that |Cr | = Dr ·S + c̃r .
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Since 0 < Q < 1 the payoff for α = 0 is always bigger than the one α = 1. Now














If 0 < γ < 1 we can rewrite the above expression as Q (Qγ )
γ
1−γ > (Qγ )
1
1−γ and
hence as γ γ > γ ; a condition that is always true for 0 < γ < 1. If γ > 1 we instead
obtain the condition γ −γ > γ −1, never true for γ > 1.
If γ = 0, the FOC trivially results in α = 0.
Hence, the best response for player i if the group placement is independent from
αi is αi = ᾱ for 0 < γ < 1 and αi = 0 for γ > 1. ⊓⊔
NE for Homogeneous Players
Here we compute what are the Nash Equilibria in the case of homogeneous players.
The proof presented here follows closely the one in Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2010a),
changing only to adapt it to the generalized payoff. Note that for homogeneous players
we have wi = w ∀i .
We first of all note that, for homogeneous players, all players playing the within
group Nash Equilibria is a best response.
Lemma 2 αi = ᾱ ∀i is a Nash Equilibrium for every value of γ .
Proof This is obviously an equilibrium. Since the mpcr Q is smaller than 1, there is
no profitable deviation in being the only one contributing more than ᾱ. A player i
deviating to a higher contribution would have the guarantee to be placed in the best
group. The best group, however, would be such only because of him, thus making it
not profitable to deviate. ⊓⊔
In order to prove the existence of the high contribution equilibrium, we first observe
that in order for the equilibrium to exist, the following conditions have to hold:
Lemma 3 If there are some strategies αi s.t. αi > ᾱ, then in equilibrium we have to
have H > S and (H mod S) > 0. Hence a player contributing more than ᾱ has a
non-zero probability to be grouped with a player contributing less than him.
Proof If the number of the highest contributors were a multiple of the group size, one
of those player could unilaterally deviate and reduce his contribution by an amount
small enough to remain in the same group and still profit from the deviation. For the
same reason, that number of players has to be bigger than S. If it were smaller, in fact,
high contributors would benefit by deviating to ᾱ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4 If there are some strategies αi s.t. αi > ᾱ, then the highest contribution h
cannot be smaller than w. I.e. αi = 1 ∀i ∈ C1.
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Proof We call αh the strategy s.t. αhw = h. From Lemma 3 we know that (one of)
the highest contributor(s) i has a non-zero probability to be grouped with some other
player contributing less. Hence, if agent i were playing αh < 1, he could increase his
contribution by an arbitrary small amount and be placed for certain in the best group.
Indeed the expected payoff for player i playing αh is at most:












h c̃1 + l





where l is the strategy played by an agent j ∈ C2 and hence l < αh . ⊓⊔
By deviating, player i would surely be placed in the best group, gaining
Ei (αh + ε) = w (1 − αh − ε) + QSwα
γ
h + O (ε) . (6)












that for a small enough ε is true. Hence player i would be better off deviating to αh +ε.
Consequently, αi = 1 ∀i ∈ C1.
Lemma 5 If there are some strategies αi s.t. αi > ᾱ, then there cannot be any player
j contributing ᾱ < α j < 1.
Proof Let us call j the player with the highest contribution after all the players con-
tributing h; i.e. j ∈ C2 and let us call his strategy αl .
If there are no ties regarding group membership, j could reduce his contribution to
αl − ε and remain in the same group.
If there are ties, j could increase his contribution by an arbitrary small amount and
be sure to be grouped together with players belonging to C1. Similarly to Lemma 4,
it is possible to prove that for an arbitrary small ε we have:
E (αl) < E (αl + ε)
and hence that α j cannot be an equilibrium strategy. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 If there are some strategies αi s.t. αi > ᾱ, then the number of players
playing the within group best response is smaller than the group size; i.e. z < S.
Proof From Lemma 3 we know that (H mod S) > 0 and hence
((N − H) mod S) > 0.
If z were bigger than the group size, a player i contributing ᾱ could increase
his payoff by an arbitrary small amount and be placed with certainty in the group
containing some players contributing h.
Hence there is a profitable deviation and z ≥ S could not be a Nash Equilibrium. ⊓⊔
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From Lemmata 3–6 follows that if an equilibrium s.t. αi > ᾱ for some i exists,
then each player plays either ᾱ or 1. Furthermore, the number of players playing the
within group best response is smaller than the group size.
From the lemmata above we can derive under which condition the generalized
voluntary contribution game has a Nash Equilibrium with high contributions level.
Hence the existence of a highly efficient equilibrium depends on the marginal per
capita rate of return, the number of players and the size of the groups.
Theorem 1 For values of γ bigger equal than a threshold value γ̄ (Q, N ,S), the
generalized voluntary contribution game has Nash Equilibria in which z < S players
contribute ᾱ and all the others N − z players contribute 1. These equilibria are in
addition to the equilibrium where all players contribute ᾱ.
For γ < γ̄ , the only NE is that all players contribute the within group best response
ᾱ.
Proof For N − z players contributing 1 to be a NE, we have to show that no full
contributor has a profitable deviation to contribute ᾱ and that no player contributing
ᾱ has an incentive to play 1. We write











E1 (ᾱ) = w (1 − ᾱ) + wQ
[
S − z − 1 + (z + 1) ᾱγ
]
(8)
Eᾱ (ᾱ) = w (1 − ᾱ) + wQ
[
S − z + zᾱγ
]
(9)
Eᾱ (1) = w
S − z + 1
N − z + 1
Q
[




N − z + 1
QSw (10)
where we indicate with E1 (α) the payoff of a high contributor and with Eᾱ (α) the
payoff of a low contributor.
For the above to be a NE we have to have that (7) > (8) and (9) > (10).
The first condition is equivalent to:
z ≥
(1 − ᾱ) N − QN (1 − ᾱγ )
Q (1 − ᾱγ ) [N − 1 − S] + 1 − ᾱ
(11)
The second condition leads to:
z ≤ 1 +
(1 − ᾱ) N − QN (1 − ᾱγ )
Q (1 − ᾱγ ) [N − 1 − S] + 1 − ᾱ
(12)
However, it is important to remember that z needs to be smaller than the size of the
groups.
Hence, we have that for values of the exponent γ such that (11) is at most S − 1,
the generalized voluntary contribution game has nearly efficient Nash Equilibria. For
values of γ s.t. (11) is bigger than S − 1 the only equilibrium is the one where all
players play the within group best response. We call γ̄ the value of γ such that eq.
(11)= S − 1. ⊓⊔
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Hence we obtain the existence of a nearly-efficient high equilibrium depends on the
marginal per capita rate of return, the number of players and the size of the groups.
NE for Heterogeneous Players
Here we show that the near efficient Nash Equilibrium cannot exist for heterogeneous
players. Furthermore, we derive under which condition the generalized voluntary con-
tribution game has a pure strategy NE.
In the following we prove the lemmata necessary to derive the equilibrium.
Lemma 7 In case of full heterogeneity11 the assumptions of Lemma 3 cannot be
satisfied.
Proof Let’s assume that they are and show that this cannot be a NE. We call k the
player with the lowest wi belonging to C1.
We have two possibilities: (a) sk = wk and (b) sk < wk
– (a):
Let’s take a player j s.t. j ∈ C1 and j 
= k. When playing s j = s
1, he has an
expected payoff of at most (because in the mixed group there could also be players
of classes lower than 2):
E ( j) ≤ w j − s

















is the probability that agent j ends up in the group where not all agents
belong to C1.
But agent j could play αε s.t. s j = s
1 + ε, being guaranteed to end up in the first
group and thus having an expected payoff of
Eε ( j) = w j − s











we have that Eε ( j) > E ( j).
12 Hence there
is a profitable deviation for agent j ; so there can’t be a NE.
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– (b):
The same as (a), except that now even for k it is profitable to deviate to sk = s
1+ε.
Hence for heterogeneous players, it is impossible to maintain the conditions under
which nearly efficient equilibrium was possible. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8 In case of full heterogeneity of endowments wi , with all wi having the same
order of magnitude, αi = ᾱ ∀i is not a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof If all players were playing ᾱ, they would be ranked based on their endowments.
Hence, a player i with the biggest endowment wi smaller than the biggest S endow-
ments would have a profitable deviation by playing αi = ᾱ + ε and be assigned to the
best group.
If the endowments are such that wi+1 > ᾱwi ∀i,
13 then there are no profitable
deviations and αi = ᾱ ∀i is a Nash Equilibrium. ⊓⊔
From the above lemmas we can derive the following theorem:
Theorem 2 In case of full heterogeneity of endowments wi , with all wi having the
same order of magnitude, for γ ≥ 1, the generalized voluntary contribution game has
as only equilibrium non-contribution by all. For 0 < γ < 1, the game has no pure
strategy NE and hence it has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Proof From Lemma 7 we know that the nearly efficient NE cannot exist for hetero-
geneous players. Furthermore, we can prove as in Lemma 5 that there can be no pure
strategies such that ᾱ < αi < 1 for any player i .
From Lemma 1 we know that for γ ≥ 1 the within group best response is to play
αi = 0 ∀i . This can be an equilibrium and hence for values of γ bigger than 1 there
is a unique pure strategy NE for the generalized voluntary contribution game.
For γ < 1, however, the within group best response is to play αi = ᾱ. But Lemma
8 shows that this cannot be an equilibrium of the game (if the values of the endowment
don’t differ too much). Hence for γ < 1 there are no pure strategy NE and thus there
has to exist a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. ⊓⊔
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